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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
J E F F SHIPLEY,
 p f a l W / 
VS. 
T H E I N D U S T R I A L COMMISSION 
O F T H E S T A T E O F U T A H , 
C & W CONTRACTING COMPANY 
and T H E T R A V E L E R S 
I N S U R A N C E COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS 
Answer of Defendants to Brief of Plaintiff on the Final 
Order from the Industrial Commission of the State of Utah 
DEFENDANTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff's brief states that Dr. Ward B. Studt's 
opinion was that Mr. Shipley is "unemployable". Plain-
tiff failed to point out that the doctor's opinion is 
based upon his examination of the plaintiff conducted 
in 1971. He testified at the Commission hearing that 
the disability rating he gave in his letter was based upon 
1 
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the Colorado standard and "represents a permanent 
responsibility of the [Colorado] Industrial Commis-
sion." [Tr. 173]. Upon cross examination, Dr. Studt 
stated that he has "no disagreement" with the Utah 
Panel's finding of 50% permanent disability for Mr. 
Shipley. [Tr. 176]. I t is of interest to note that Dr. 
Studt's medical report filed with the Industrial Com-
mission of Utah states that the x-rays disclose an old 
fracture of the D-12 vertebra of Mr. Shipley. [Tr. 3l. 
The Statement of Facts in plaintiff's brief also 
calls for clarification on other points. A substantial 
part of the so-called disability and physical condition of 
Mr. Shipley, as set forth in the plaintiff's brief, is 
based upon Mr. Shipley's self-serving statements. That 
is true of the opinions of Mr. Karl F . Kraync and Mr. 
Lynn Greenwood, stressed in plaintiff's brief. Even 
the Medical Panel had to re^ly somewhat on Mr. Ship-
ley's complaints made to the members of the panel. 
Incidentally, it is to be noted that Mr. Kranyc's letter 
of August 15,1972, addressed to the Commission, failed 
to mentioned Dr. Pemberton's medical report on file 
there. [Tr. 114]. 
In plaintiff's brief it is claimed that Travelers did 
nothing to prove Mr. Shipley's employability. Con-
trary to that statement, Travelers, in an effort to 
learn the complete medical facts in the case, sent Mr. 
Shipley to Dr. Pemberton for examination in Feb-
ruary, 1971. [Tr. 87]. Also, in January of 1972, Trav-
elers recommended to Dr. Munsey, plaintiff's family 
doctor, that Mr. Shipley be sent to another orthopedic 
2 
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physician. Dr. Sherman S. Coleman's examination is 
summarized in the Medical Panel's report. [Tr. 127]. 
Both Dr. Pemberton and Dr. Coleman are outstand-
ing orthopedists. Dr. Pemberton's report states that 
his examination of Mr. Shipley "shows him to walk 
without a limp. He has some moderate restrictions of 
motion in the lumber spine." [Tr. 7]. In his report, 
Dr. Pemberton estimated that Mr. Shipley's "present 
permanent partial disability rating" if he has no back 
surgery, to be about 40% of the body, whereas if Mr. 
Shipley were to have a spinal fusion, "he could go back 
to work with probably 20% permanent partial disabil-
ity." [Tr. 8]. Dr. Studt's report of April 3, 1971, 
recommends that Mr. Shipley probably would do well 
to accept Dr. Pemberton's disability estimate. [Tr. 12]. 
In his letter of April 12, 1971, to Travelers, Dr. Studt 
stated that his estimate of the permanent disability rat-
ing for Mr. Shipley under the Colorado law would 
"seem compatible with Dr. Pemberton's rating." 
[Tr. 2]. 
Plaintiff's Statement of Facts also failed to men-
tion that Dr. Coleman's report of January 26, 1972, 
addressed to Dr. J . P . Munsey, stated the x-rays of 
Mr. Shipley disclosed an old deformity of the left hip, 
existing prior to the subject accident; and it is diffi-
cult to explain why Mr. Shipley had a series of lumbar 
spine x-rays in 1967. [Tr. 71]. Dr. Coleman further 
commented in his letter that after reviewing Mr. Ship-
ley's case, "it becomes increasingly difficult to explain 
his persistent pain on the basis of residuals of the in-
jury." [Tr. 71]. 
3 
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For defendant to have investigated further the 
condition of Mr. Shipley's disability would be a prac-
tical impossibility. To verify his claim of disability 
would no doubt have required the bugging of his home 
and the shadowing of his activities, and even those 
might) have proven inadequate. 
The medical examinations and undisputed reports 
of the doctors in this case are the most reliable and 
proper means of determining the degree of Mr. Ship-
ley's permanent disability. 
In line with the medical reports contained in the 
case, Travelers has paid Mr. Shipley the sum of $6,-
053.54 for temporary total disability and $2,168 for 
permanent partial disability pending the final decision 
in this case; and additional sums for the hospital and 
medical expenses of Mr. Shipley, including medica-
tions [Tr. 105-113, 217]. 
The findings in the report of the Medical Panel 
appointed by the Industrial Commission are to be con-
sidered factual evidence in each case, and this court so 
holds; Jensen v. United States Fuel Co. 18 U 2d 414, 
424P.2d440 (1967). 
Finding No. 1. covers the temporary total dis-
ability item [Tr. 131]. 
Finding No. 2 is as follows: 
"As a reasonable medical probability, there is 50% 
permanent partial disability of the body as a whole as 
a result of this accident of October 27, 1969. 
4 
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Finding No. 3 refers to Mr. Shipley's peripheral 
vascular disease. 
Finding No. 4 states that there is no evidence of 
a respiratory or cardiac problem. 
Finding No. 5 states that Mr. Shipley "is taking 
an inordinate amount of medication" in view of the ob-
jective physical findings. [Tr. 131]. 
In Finding No. 6 the Panel found that Mr. Ship-
ley "reached a fixed state some time ago. . ." [Tr. 131]. 
The Medical Panel had before it all of the physic-
ians' reports contained in the record; and conclusions 
of the Utah Board of Education on the subject of em-
ployability of Mr. Shipley. Defendants respectfully 
call attention to the results of the Panel physical ex-
amination of Mr. Shipley, which certainly does not 
call for more than a finding of 50% permanent partial 
disability. I t is immaterial whether or not the hearing 
examiner submitted to the Panel an explicit question 
as to the total disability, since the Panel is empowered 
to find and could find such disability if it believed the 
facts so warranted. More important, the decision as 
to the disability of a claimant is reserved by law to the 
Commission. Sec. 35-1-85, U.C.A., 1953; Crittendon 
vs. Industrial Commission, 25 U2d 193, 479 P.2d 347 
(1971). 
Plaintiff would have the case turn upon Mr. Ship-
ley's claim of "unemployability", but that is not the 
proper measure of a disability rating under the Work-
men's Compensation Act. See 35-1-66, UCA, 1953, 
5 
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annotated; and Wilstead v. Industrial Commission, 17 
U2d 214, 407 P2d 692 (1965). The findings of the 
Industrial Commission do contain a reference to the 
unemployability factor. Also see 35-1-67, UC A,1953# 
That statute refers to "loss of bodily function". And 
see the case of Markus v. Industrial Commission, 5 
Utah 2d 347, 301 P2d, 1804, (1956). In that decision, 
involving a back injury and an appeal by the employee, 
this Court ruled upon section 35-1-66, UCA, 1953, on 
partial disability as follows: 
"This section gives the commission discretion in 
its rating of loss of bodily function, which we 
cannot disturb unless clearly arbitrary. When 
the legislature authorized awards for other dis-
figurements or losses of bodily function which 
are not scheduled in the act, it apparently had in 
mind awards of proportionate amounts for dis-
figurements or losses of bodily function of sim-
ilar nature to those scheduled." 
Also, it is to be noted that certain parts of Mr. Shipley's 
testimony and evidence relating to the employability 
aspect of the claim cast serious doubts on that con-
tention. 
Let us see what Mr. Shipley and his wife stated 
at the Commission hearing concerning his condition of 
disability. H e testified at both Commission hearings 
that he has made no attempt or effort to find employ-
ment since the subject accident. [Tr. 90, 195]. At the 
hearing of September 12, 1973, he stated that he drove 
his car from Moab to Salt Lake on the previous day 
and that after about two hours of driving he "usually 
6 
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stops and walks around some." [Tr. 192]; that at such 
times he has some pain in his back. He works in his 
garden at home, and sleeps "pretty good." H e further 
testified that he does not take a nap in the day time 
because he would then not sleep at night; that he does 
rest some after lunch. [Tr. 193, 194]. He can tolerate 
the pain he occasionally has without medication most 
of the time but that he takes Demerol and a Soma 
compound "as a muscle relaxer" [Tr. 194]. When 
asked if his wife gave him assistance in moving around 
and doing things for him he answered, "Oh, not a 
whole lot. I help myself mostly. I can do a lot of 
things. I don't lift heavy things, if I can keep from 
it." He said that he does not use his cane when in the 
house but he uses it pretty much. [Tr. 195]. Mrs. Ship-
ley testified that her husband goes down to the coffee 
shop and then back to his house, and that is his "usual 
daily pattern." [Tr. 203]. She also stated that Mr. 
Shipley turns the water on the lawn and goes out to 
the garden and "fools around awhile." [Tr. 202]. 
Mr. Shipley further testified that social security 
payments received on behalf of himself, his wife, and 
boy at the time of the September 1973 hearing 
amounted to $458.00 per month, of which $242.00 is for 
Mr. Shipley's disability, frr. Adfi), 
Defendants question the reliability of Mr. Kray-
nac's opinion concerning Mr. Shipley's condition. That 
opinion was based "somewhat on which Mr. Shipley 
told him". Mr. Kraynac stated that he is no medical 
expert, and that he was furnished only medical records 
7 
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by "the disability determination unit of Social Secur-
ity." [Tr. 180]. Evidently he did not have before him 
or even consider the reports of Dr. Pemberton or Dr. 
Coleman, 
Mr. Lynn Greenwood testified on behalf of plain-
tiff. He stated that he is employed by the Utah De-
partment of Employment Security as a vocational 
counsel and that his opinion of Mr. Shipley's condi-
tion results from a one hour interview, and he had 
never seen any medical records in the case. He further 
testified that his opinion is based "substantially" upon 
plaintiff's statement to him. 
The Court's attention is called to the fact that both 
35-1-66, U.C.A., 1953 (partial disability) and Section 
35-1-67, U.C.A. 1953, speak of "loss of bodily func-
tion." Section 66 clearly indicates that the measure of 
disability is the particular loss of bodily function 
whether it be covered by the types of injuries therein 
listed or by any other type of injuries. Section 67, 
pertaining to total disability, shows that the function 
of the rehabilitation division follows the commissions' 
findings of permanent total disability. In plaintiff's 
brief he is trying to reverse the procedure by saying 
that if the vocational rehabilitation division finds that 
plaintiff is unemployable, then the commission must 
so find. Plaintiff would substitute the opinions of the 
rehabilitation people, who are really untrained in med-
ical matters, for the expert opinions of the members of 
the medical panel and for the findings of the Industrial 
Commission. 
8 
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Defendants respectfully submit that the evidence 
in this case is more than adequate to support the order 
of the Industrial Commission, and calls for the affirm-
ance of its award. 
D E F E N D A N T S ' A R G U M E N T 
A N D A U T H O R I T I E S 
Plaintiff's contention is that the order of the Com-
mission denying plaintiff recovery in this case is be-
yond the power of the Commission and is arbitrary 
and capricious. An important factor in this case is the 
report of the Medical Panel. Plaintiff never made an 
objection to the panel report and, in fact, in his letter 
to the Commission, plaintiff accepted the report "on 
the condition that the Medical Board finding of a 50% 
permanent partial disability is viewed only as a medical 
finding of physical impairment, reserving for the Com-
mission the legal conclusions as to whether or not the 
Claimant is permanently and totally disabled by con-
sidering in addition to the physical impairment the 
economic and employment-related factors." [Tr. 139]. 
In the Findings and Conclusions of the Commission 
the hearing examiner comments that plaintiff has ac-
cepted the Panel report. [Tr. 219]. In Sec. 35-1-77, 
U.C.A. 1953, the duties and the purpose of the Med-
ical Panel are stated. I t is obvious they are just as the 
aforesaid letter of the plaintiff sets out: that the report 
is deemed evidence and "the commission may base its 
findings and decision on the report of the panel, but 
shall not be bound by such report if there is other 
9 
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substantial conflicting evidence in the case which sup-
ports a contrary finding by the commission." 
In the case of Jensen v. United States Fuel Com-
pany and the Industrial Commission of Utah, supra, 
this Court acknowledged the value of an impartial med-
ical panel: 
". . . Its proper purpose is limited to medical 
examination and diagnosis ,the evidence of which 
is to be considered by the Commission in arriv-
ing at its decision." 
As this court has often held, the rule in such a 
case as we have here is that the plaintiff has the bur-
den to affirmatively establish his claim. See the case 
of Garner v. Hecla Mining Company, 19 U2d 367, 
431 P.2d 794; (1967) where the court stated: 
"I t is the prerogative of the Commission, and not 
of any individual witness, or even of the medical 
panel, to judge the credibility of the evidence, 
and upon the basis of the whole evidence to de-
termine the facts. The plaintiff having failed to 
so persuade the Commission, it is the duty of this 
court to survey the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the findings and order; and we can-
not reverse and compel an award unless there is 
credible evidence without substantial contradic-
tion which points so clearly and persuasively in 
plaintiffs' favor that failure to so find must be 
regarded as capricious and arbitrary. Converse-
ly, if there is any reasonable basis in the evidence, 
or from the lack of evidence, which will justify 
the refusal to so find, we must affirm." 
The Garner opinion then cited in support of its 
ruling the case of Kent v. Industrial Commission, 89 
10 
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Utah 381, 57 P.2d 724 (1936) and Vause v. In-
dustrial Commission, 17 Utah 2d 217, 407 P.2d 1006 
(1965). 
The statute setting forth the authority of the In-
dustrial Commission of Utah is stated in Section 35-
1-85, U.C.A., 1953. That provision, construed by this 
court in many decisions, is as follows: 
"The findings and conclusions of the commission 
on questions of fact shall be conclusive and final 
and shall not be subject to review; such questions 
of fact shall include ultimate facts and the find-
ings and conclusions of the commission." 
The court's attention is called to the extensive an-
notations in that section. 
In Wilstead v. The Industrial Commission of 
Utah, supra, this court was asked to review an order 
of the Industrial Commission to have a disability award 
increased to give plaintiff further compensation. The 
Commission had found the plaintiff sustained severe 
back injuries and was unemployed for more than a year, 
and that he was finally re-employed in his former posi-
tion. Plaintiff claimed that he should have total dis-
ability for additional time until the medical advisory 
board give him a disability rating. The court observed: 
"The important point to note here is that com-
pensation during total disability does not neces-
sarily mean until the employee is able to do his 
former work." 
This court affirmed the award of the Commission, thus 
denying plaintiff's claim for the disability payments. 
11 
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The rule of law well established by this court in re-
viewing the orders of the Industrial Commission is well 
stated in the case of Vause v. The Commission, supra. 
While the facts involve an occupational disease, the de-
cision is applicable here. We quote from the decision 
affirming the award: 
"This court cannot properly reverse the Com-
mission and compel an award unless there is 
credible evidence without substantial contradic-
tion which points so clearly and persuasively in 
plaintiff's favor that failure to so find would 
justify the conclusion that Commission acted 
capriciously, arbitrarily or unreasonably in dis-
regarding or refusing to believe the evidence." 
The opinion of Justice Crockett in the above de-
cision also contains this statement: 
"The weakness in plaintiff's position is one not 
uncommon in appeals to this court: of becoming 
so absorbed in his own contentions and so pre-
occupied with the assumed righteousness of his 
own case that he is unable or unwilling to give 
proper consideration to the countervailing evid-
ence. Such an intransigent approach is cer-
tainly of no help to the court, nor is it of any ad-
vantage to the party involved. I t is a disserve to 
to any cause to make unsupportable claims for 
it, because discovery of the fallacy tends to dis-
credit and weaken the entire case and thus to 
impair whatever merit it may have. Our statu-
tory and decisional law require us to look at the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the Com-
mission's finding, and it is the obligation of the 
parties involved to so present the matter to the 
court." 
12 
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A later decision of this court approved the afore-
said rule set forth in the Vause case, supra, and Gar-
ner vs. Hecla Mining Company, supra. See Duaine 
Brown Chevrolet Co. v. Industrial Commission, 511 
P.2d 743, 29 Utah 2d 478 (1973). 
P L A I N T I F F ' S A U T H O R I T I E S 
Plaintiff's brief cites in support of his total dis-
ability argument, Spring Canyon Coal Company vs. 
Industrial Commission, 74 Utah 103, 277 P . 206; 
United Park City Mines Company vs. Prescott, 15 
Utah 2d 410; 393 P.2d 800 and Morrison Knudsen 
Construction Company vs. Industrial Commission, 18 
Utah 2d 390, 424 P.2d 138. 
In the Spring Canyon case the plaintiff suffered 
a very serious leg disability, with partial paralysis in 
both legs so that he needed two canes for getting about; 
the finding was that he could really use his body only 
from the waist up. In spite of those injuries, this 
court reversed the commission's award and reduced the 
percentage of disability. The United Park City case 
and the Morrison Knudsen decision are readily distin-
guishable from the instant case. In both decisions this 
court affirmed the order of the commission awarding 
permanent total disability. In each case the injuries 
were much more serious and severe than those suffered 
by Mr. Shipley. In the United Park City case the 
employee suffered an amputation of the leg at the knee, 
13 
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and it was very difficult to apply an artificial limb. 
In each case the employee attempted or performed 
some work after the industrial accident. 
Plaintiff also cites and quotes from Caillet v. In-
dustrial Commission of Utah, 90 Utah 8, 58 P.2d 760 
(1936). That decision involved much more serious 
injuries than we have here and is a case in which this 
court affirmed the order of the Industrial Commis-
sion. The said quote used by plaintiff shows that de-
cision to be no authority for plaintiff's argument 
since the case refers to a stiuation where "the evidence 
conclusively shows that the employee is permanently 
and totally disabled." We do not have that situation 
with Mr. Shipley. The decision also points out that 
the employee must make a real effort to obtain work 
after the aci«dent if he is at all able to perform some 
work. 
Plaintiff's argument also relies upon the text 
known as Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, 
Section 5750, and speaks of an "odd-lot" doctrine. An 
examination of Mr. Larson's annotations in support 
of that section discloses that the cases nearly always 
inviove much more serious injuries than we have here, 
and usually refer to decisions affirming the particular 
state's industrial commission. Some of Larson's cases 
involve a jury. Many of the decisions he cites point 
out that the particular employee made a real effort 
to obtain some work after the accident. H e cites the 
Utah case of Caillet v. Industrial Commission, supra< 
The facts and the law in each case Mr. Larson cites 
14 
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must be examined because the applicable statute in 
each state varies from state to state. In fact, his text 
does not mention the type of procedure now existing 
in Utah where the award of the Industrial Commission 
cannot be disturbed except as provided in Section 35-
1-84, U.C.A. 1953. 
Plaintiff's argument, especially at page 11 and 
12 of his brief, ignores the findings of the Medical 
Panel and the authoritative decision handed down by 
the Industrial Commission. Plaintiff states that in our 
case the examiner and the commission appear to have 
decided the case by some compromise "not permitted 
by law and the undisputed facts here." In view of the 
Medical Panel's report, the reports of the examining 
physicians, Drs. Coleman and Pemberton, as well as 
the testimony of Dr. Studt that he has no disagree-
ment with the panel's finding of 50% permanent dis-
ability, how can it be said that the examiner and the 
commission acted arbitrarily or resorted to compromise 
in arriving at the award. I t is apparent that plaintiff 
ignores the standard for review by this court as set out 
in the aforesaid section, 35-1-84, U.C.A. 1953. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants respectfully submit that neither the 
record in this case nor plaintiff's argument establishes 
that the Industrial Commission has exceeded its powers 
or acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner under the 
15 
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law by its order denying plaintiff's application for a 
compensation award of permanent total disability. 
The Workmen's Compensation laws of Utah and 
the decisions of this court clearly establish that the In-
dustrial Commission's Order and its award of 50 percent 
permanent partial disability should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
W. J . O'Connor, J r . of 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker 
400 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendants C & W 
Contracting Co. and The Travelers 
Insurance Co. 
Vernon G. Romney 
Attorney General of the State of Utah 
Utah State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Industrial Commission 
of Utah 
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